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KAUWAERANGA IN CONTEXT 
Fergus Sinclair * 
Much controversy throughout the world has surrounded aboriginal territorial and non­ 
territorial rights.  In New Zealand, the decision last century of Chief Judge Fenton in 
Kauweranga has been upheld as a major precedent for non­territorial Maori fishing rights.  The 
author explores in much greater detail than before the circumstances of the decision, and claims 
that without such an examination old authorities such as Kauwaeranga will be of limited value. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Kauwaeranga decision was delivered in 1870 by F D Fenton, Chief Judge of the 
Native Land Court.  The judgment has often been discussed in the literature generated by 
Maori claims. Opinions differ.  It has been lauded as a recognition of Maori fishing rights 
and a precedent for the existence of "non­territorial" aboriginal titles in New Zealand. It 
has also been portrayed as ushering in a more conservative approach to foreshore claims, 
and Fenton has been attacked for bending to policy considerations in refusing to issue a 
freehold title.  The case is likely to attract continued attention, but it appears that it is not 
well understood.   An attempt is made here to explore the context and impact of the 
decision and discuss its treatment in recent commentary. 1 
One misapprehension may be dealt with at once.  It has been said that the Native 
Land Court  in the 1860s "awarded some important tidal areas to various Maori as 
property rights and not merely as rights to fish." 2 The basis for this view appears to be 
the Whatapaka case which was referred to in the Waitangi Tribunal's Manukau Report. 3 
Whatapaka involved a piece of land alongside the Manukau harbour and a shell bank 
* Barrister and Solicitor of the High Court of New Zealand, Wellington. 
1 Most of the research for this article was conducted in 1989­90.  Since that time, I have had the 
benefit of reading various publications by R P Boast and the claimant evidence in the Hauraki 
claim.  Although helpful, this material does not refer to primary sources of which I was unaware. 
Whenever possible I have cited the archival locations of primary documents.  I am grateful to J B 
Parker for his help with the research. 
2 Waitangi Tribunal Muriwhenua Fishing Report 1988, 84. 
3 Waitangi Tribunal Manukau Report 1985 paragraph 6.2.
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separated from the mainland by a channel of water.  The surveyor testified to the court 
that the bank was not covered at ordinary high tide but was covered by spring tides. 4 
The inclusion of this area in the court's order was therefore not an award of the foreshore 
which, under the definition then applicable, began at mean high water mark.  An official 
return of Crown grants to the foreshore published in 1868 does not list any grant to a 
Maori owner. 5 The novelty of a Land Court claim to the foreshore proper was alluded to 
in Kauwaeranga, which Fenton described as "the first case of the kind that has occurred in 
the colony." 6 There is no reason to suppose that the Chief Judge was incorrect. 7 
II BACKGROUND TO KAUWAERANGA 
The foreshore opposite the towns of Shortland and Grahamstown (now Thames) was 
a broad mudflat formed by sediments from the Waihou and Kauwaeranga rivers.  It was 
an important flounder fishing ground.  Godwits and shellfish were also taken.  In times 
past, stakes had been driven into the mud to support fishing nets. 8 By 1870, these had 
mostly been broken off by ships, but there apparently remained some stone walls 
associated with the fishing. 9 It seems that the mudflat was difficult to cross by foot 
except near the beach, and there had been some encroachment by the sea over what had 
once been dry ground. 10 
The land next to the foreshore was still in Maori hands, but was subject to an 
agreement signed in 1867 that enabled the area to be administered as a goldfield.  There 
had been rapid development of the Thames field.  Townships had been laid out and rents 
were paid to the Maori owners, who had divided the land into parcels and obtained 
certificates from the Native Land Court. 
4 Native Land Court, Auckland Minute Book 1 pp 110­111. 
5 [1868] AJHR C­3. 
6 A  Frame "Kauwaeranga Judgment"  (1984) 14 VUWLR 227, 244. 
7 Richard Boast has claimed that "despite Chief Judge Fenton's repudiation of the practice in the 
Kauwaeranga decisioán, the Land Court granted a number of freehold (ie not merely fisheries) 
titles to areas between high and low­water mark.  These grants of  freehold title to areas below 
high­water mark were also mainly in the Thames area." R P  Boast "In Re Ninety Mile Beach 
Revisited: The Native Land Court and the Foreshore in New Zealand Legal History" (1993) 23 
VUWLR 145, 152.  I have viewed the material referred to without finding any documentation to 
support this assertion.  It may be that there has been some confusion with purchase deeds relating 
to the variously named parcels of the Thames foreshore. 
8 [1869] AJHR F­7 7. 
9 Native Land Court, Hauraki Minute Book 4,  210. 
10 A  Frame "Kauwaeranga Judgment" (1984) 14 VUWLR 227, 229.
KAUWAERANGA IN CONTEXT 141 
It soon became known that the auriferous reefs extended beneath the mudflat.  James 
Mackay, who had negotiated the mining agreement and acted as Warden of the new 
goldfield, was asked to register a claim over parts of the foreshore.  Mackay seems to 
have thought that his 1867 agreement did not apply below high water mark.  In any 
event, he was instructed by the Provincial Government to decline the application and 
receive no more. 11 
The uncertain status of the Thames foreshore came to the attention of the General 
Government. With a view to clarification, section 9 of the Gold Fields Act Amendment 
Act 1868 provided that land  below high water mark could be included in a gold field, 
but where such land abutted land over which the native title was unextinguished, or 
which was held under a certificate from the Native Land Court, "such land so lying 
below high­water mark shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be land over which 
the Native title has not been extinguished." This section apparently reflected the view of 
the Native Minister, J C  Richmond, that the prerogative right to the foreshore ought not 
to apply where the adjoining land remained in Maori possession. 12 Richmond's 
directions to Mackay advised him: 13 
...that this land is in an exceptional legal position.  The Native title over it would probably not 
be recognized by courts of law; at the same time, it is not within the definition of Crown Land, 
or subject to the ordinary Waste Land laws.  The Gold Fields Act of this Session points out how 
it may be dealt with ­ ie by agreement between the Colonial Government and the Native 
owners of adjacent land. 
Mackay was instructed to "arrange with the Native owners for the occupation of this 
tidal flat upon reasonable terms". 14 
The Government had hoped that section 9 would prevent any private party from 
treating with Maori for rights in the foreshore.  It did not, however, deter such 
negotiations, and at the same time Mackay made little progress towards securing the 
beach for the Government. 15 
Concern at these developments led the new Fox ministry to introduce the Thames Sea 
Beach  Bill in 1869.  The Bill was intended to remove any doubt about the Crown's 
prerogative right to the beach by declaring it to be Crown demesne.  Private dealings 
11 [1869] AJHR F­7, 7. 
12 (9 Oct 1968) 4 NZPD 248 and (1 Sept 1869) 6 NZPD 903. 
13 G S Cooper to Mackay, 9 August 1869, [1869] AJHR, F­7, 15. 
14 Above n 13. 
15 [1869] AJHR F­7, pp 7­8.
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were to be forbidden; the Government could let or sell the land, and any miners' right 
fees would be paid to the Maori owners of the adjoining land. 16 The Select Committee on 
the Bill heard considerable evidence and counselled a different approach.  It reported that 
legislation should be delayed until the question of Crown and Maori claims upon the 
foreshore and precious metals had been resolved.  In the meantime, the Government 
should make an arrangement with Maori to obtain control of the Thames foreshore. 17 
A more limited measure was substituted and passed as the Shortland Beach Act 1869. 
This prohibited private dealings over the foreshore and invalidated past dealings.  It was 
apparently expected that the Act would merely freeze the position until further 
legislation could be introduced. The debate on the Bill is of some interest, particularly for 
Richmond's comments as to why it was too late to assert the Crown's prerogative in its 
strictest form.  He observed that, in various ways, there had been a relaxation of 
prerogative claims over the mainland since at least 1846.  It was strange therefore that: 
...this wretched little strip of land on the Shortland beach was now, on the plea of prerogative 
rights unknown and incomprehensible to the Natives, to cause a renewed assertion of those 
beneficial rights which we had abandoned as to every other part of the Colony. 
He went on to explain that the waiver of any Crown claim to beneficial ownership of 
the foreshore in this case would not represent a great sacrifice, because: 18 
[a]ll the great ports of the Colony, for all present purposes, had been alienated by the Natives. 
There never was, he believed, in their minds, any doubt that, in alienating the terra firma, all 
that abutted upon it on the coast was also alienated, unless there was a special reservation. 
The fact that there was such reservation in some cases, showed that total alienation was the 
rule. 
III WHAKAHARATAU AND KAUWAERANGA ­ 1870 
Before the Thames foreshore claims were heard in 1870, there was no history of 
Native Land Court cases concerning the foreshore proper.  The Gold Fields Act 
Amendment Act of 1868 had raised an implication that the foreshore opposite Shortland 
would be regarded as subject to native title.  The actions of the Government in treating 
with Maori for control of the beach seemed to confirm that the Crown's prerogative 
would not be strictly applied. Parliament had excluded individuals from acquiring rights 
in the foreshore at Thames, but had otherwise left open the question of Crown and Maori 
rights. 
16 (3 August 1869) 6 NZPD 196. 
17 [1869] AJHR F­7, 3. 
18 (1 Sept 1869) 6 NZPD 903.
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So matters stood when Chief Judge Fenton heard the first application to a piece of 
Hauraki foreshore in May.  The portion claimed was called Whakaharatau and was 
slightly more than an acre.  It seems likely that it was a portion of Whakaharatau A No 1, 
which adjoined Shortland and was later the subject of an award under the principle laid 
down in the Kauwaeranga case.  The land was entirely below high water mark, but had 
once been dry ground on which four houses had stood. The claimant, Rawira Te 
Wahapu, spoke about fishing and pipi­gathering but seemed to indicate that these 
activities had occurred away from the land in question .19 
The court was addressed by counsel for the claimants on the advisability of referring 
the question of the Land Court's jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.  Fenton gave a short 
judgment because he thought that only a decision of the Supreme Court would be of any 
use as a precedent. 20 He briefly stated that he could find no reason at law that prevented 
a Maori from owning land covered by the sea at high water ­ "the question of ownership 
of any portion of the foreshore by a Maori must depend simply on a question of fact." 21 
On this occasion, he held that no ownership had been proved except for the portion on 
which the houses had formerly stood, but as it was accepted that the case must stand or 
fall as a whole, he dismissed the application. 
It has been suggested that Fenton's reference to ownership being purely a question of 
fact was a recognition that Maori might own the fee simple of the foreshore, and that he 
retreated from this position in Kauwaeranga on grounds of policy alone. 22 Fenton's 
observations were, in a sense, merely obiter because the facts did not oblige him to make 
a definite pronouncement on the law.  But in any case, the argument overlooks the next 
sentence in his decision which states: 23 
At the same time I do not suppose that the Maoris would have ever claimed any right over 
such land except in the few cases where they had used it in the way of sole property for 
fisheries... 
19 Native Land Court, Hauraki Minute Book 4, 191.  The witnesses' statements about pipi­gathering 
appear ambiguous in the minutes, but there was apparently no fishing with nets on the land before 
the court. 
20 Native Land Court, Hauraki Minute Book 4,  201, 203. 
21 Above n 20, 202. 
22 A  Frame "Kauwaeranga Judgment" (1984) 14 VUWLR 227, 239 note 3. A  Parsonson "The 
Challenge to Mana Maori", in G W  Rice (ed) The Oxford History of New Zealand (2ed, Oxford, 
Auckland, 1992) 194. Muriwhenua Fishing Report 84. 
23 Native Land Court, Hauraki Minute Book 4, 202.
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This remark contains the germ of his reasoning in Kauwaeranga and it is difficult to see 
any major inconsistency between the two judgments. 
In Kauwaeranga, Fenton contrasted the result in Whakaharatau with the evidence of 
consistent and exclusive use now before him. This suggests that the applicant in 
Whakaharatau had simply failed to meet an evidential threshold that was satisfied in other 
cases involving the same foreshore.  In an earlier, private letter to Donald McLean, 
however, Fenton suggested that the Whakaharatau decision would mean, in effect, that the 
Shortland foreshore as a whole would vest in the Crown.  He was concerned that the 
Government's continued attempts to buy out Maori claims would be seen as 
undermining the court's decision and lead to European speculators stirring up other 
claims around New Zealand ­ "[t]hat stupid clause of Richmond's in the Gold Fields Act 
is the cause of all this bother". 24 The Government's response was that it never intended to 
forgo the Crown's right to the land below high water mark but, in view of the 
expectations raised by the Gold Fields Act 1866 and actions by the previous ministry, it 
would only be fair to pay compensation "for the supposed rights of wh[ich] they are 
deprived." 25 In any case, the negotiations had broken down by August 1870, for reasons 
unconnected with the Whakaharatau judgment. 26 
Fenton did not rule out all Maori claims to the foreshore, instancing a famous pipi 
ground about a mile away "which perhaps they may get but it is not certain." 27 It is not 
clear why he thought at this stage that other claims to the Shortland beach would fail, but 
his private comments to McLean suggest that, contrary to what is usually asserted, 
Kauwaeranga represents a more liberal approach on his part. 
The foreshore question again came before the Native Land Court at Shortland on 8­11 
November.  Fenton first heard claims by Nikorima Poutotara and others to portions of 
the beach opposite Grahamstown ­ the applications that would lead to the Kauwaeranga 
decision.  He ordered certificates in favour of the successful claimants "for the right they 
exercised" but left open the question of "whether they owned below the surface". 28 The 
foreshore adjoining Shortland was the subject of an overarching claim by the Ngati 
Rautao chief, Hotereni Taipari,  and some twenty others whose rights he admitted. 
24 Fenton to McLean, 16 August 1870, MS 32, folder 267, Alexander Turnbull Library. 
25 G S Cooper to the Civil Commissioner, Auckland, 3 September 1870 (draft) N S  70­1112, MA 1 
1872/1854, 7, National Archives. 
26 H T  Clarke to McLean, 24 August 1870, MS 32, folder 217, Alexander Turnbull Library. 
27 Fenton to McLean, 16 August 1870, MS 32, folder 267, Alexander Turnbull Library. 
28 Native Land Court, Hauraki Minute Book 4,  211.
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Taipari asserted ownership "irrespective of the ownership of the land adjoining". 29 He 
was opposed by the owners of certain sections on the mainland (apparently members of 
Ngati Whanaunga and other tribes).  The contention of these people, as reported in the 
Daily Southern Cross, was that "if they owned the solid ground, the mud flat opposite 
must be theirs also, or at least the fisheries, and pipi banks thereto appertaining." 30 
The court decided against Taipari's wider claim and indicated it would award rights 
to all the owners of the adjacent shores. The tidal beds of the Kauwaeranga River, being 
land below low water mark, were excluded. 31 The character of the rights to be 
recognised was again left open.  Some preliminary argument was heard on this point on 
11 November, but the Crown having expressed a wish to be heard, the matter was 
adjourned for a sitting at Auckland later that month.  The arguments of counsel are 
recorded in some detail both in the court minutes and the Daily Southern Cross. 32 Fenton 
reserved judgment and, not for the last time, expressed  his anxiety for the issues to be 
decided by the Supreme Court. 
The Kauwaeranga decision was delivered on 3 December.  It is reproduced in a number 
of easily accessible sources and there is no need to dwell on the Judge's lengthy recitation 
of historical events. 33 As is well known, Fenton declined to make an order vesting the 
soil of the foreshore absolutely.  He held instead that the interest owned by the Maori 
was an exclusive right of fishery.  The Government's negotiations were "not needed to 
strengthen the case of the claimants, for it has not appeared what rights the Government 
recognised, and they may be the same that the court awards." 34 The Gold Fields Act 
Amendment Act 1868 was, he noted, limited to the purposes of that Act, and Parliament 
had not yet passed any law on the matter, as was contemplated when the Shortland 
Beach Act was passed. 
The precise form of the awards was settled at a further hearing on 24 May 1871. The 
court adopted the Crown's proposal that the certificates should contain the words: 35 
29 Native Land Court, Hauraki Minute Book 4,  217. 
30 Daily Southern Cross, 15 November 1870, 3. 
31 Native Land Court, Hauraki Minute Book 4, 229. 
32 Daily Southern Cross, 22 November 1870, 3. Native Land Court,  Hauraki Minute Book 4,  230­234. 
33 A  Frame "Kauwaeranga Judgment" (1984) 14 VUWLR 227. 
34 "Kauwaeranga Judgment', reprinted from the Daily Southern Cross, Hocken Library, 11. The version 
at (1984) 14 VUWLR  227, 245 omits the second word "not". 
35 Native Land Court, Hauraki Minute Book 4,  239.
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... the exclusive right of fishing upon and using for the purpose of fishing, whether with stake 
nets or otherwise the surface of the soil of all that portion of the foreshore or parcel of land 
between high water mark and low water mark. 
The effect of these orders was the division of the foreshore into parcels corresponding 
to the sections on dry land, the exclusive right of fishing being vested in the owners of 
those sections. 36 In some cases the parcels were long thin rectangles of beach. Individuals 
such as Taipari (who  had one of the least valuable areas) owned rights over several 
hundred acres of mudflat. 37 
Fenton detained the certificates while waiting to hear if his judgment would be 
appealed.  The claimants had still not ruled out an appeal by August 1871, but by this 
time the Government had renewed its overtures to buy the Maori rights. 38 E W Puckey, 
who was entrusted with this task, found it hard to secure the mudflat in one offer, and 
predicted more success in buying the rights separately. 39 The main obstacle was Rapana 
Maunganoa, who, urged on by his son­in­law David Stewart, successfully held out for a 
sum of £1,500. By the end of 1873 the government had paid more than £2,800 in 
extinguishing Maori claims over the Thames foreshore. 40 Two forms of wording were 
used in purchase deeds.  Some documents recited the rights conferred by the Native 
Land Court and recorded the conveyance of those rights to the Crown.   Most of the 
deeds signed after 1871 contained the formula: 
... the said natives doth hereby convey...  All that portion of the foreshore or parcel of land 
between high­water mark and low­water mark.... with all the rights and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging And all other estate right title interest and demand whatsoever if any of 
the said Native in and to the said foreshore... unto Her Majesty... Provided always that this 
deed and nothing herein contained or implied shall be deemed in any way to infringe upon or 
affect the undoubted prerogatives of Her said Majesty... as the sole and absolute sovereign of 
the whole territory of New Zealand its shores and waters... 
36 This appears to be the arrangement sought by the Coromandel claimants also.  See brief of 
evidence, "Coromandel Foreshore", MA MLP 1 82/5, National Archives. 
37 H T  Clarke to McLean, 6 August 1870, MS 32, folder 217, Alexander Turnbull Library. 
38 Daily Southern Cross, 7 August 1871. 
39 E W Puckey to McLean, 5 August 1871, MS Papers 32, folder 518, Alexander Turnbull Library. 
40 Daily Southern Cross, 11 October 1871. E W Puckey to McLean, 14 July 1871, 17 July 1872, MS 
Papers 32, folder 518, Alexander Turnbull Library.  Payments recorded in AP2/21, National 
Archives, and AJHR, 1873, G­3, no 11, p  16.
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IV THE COROMANDEL FORESHORE CASE AND MOVES TO LEGISLATE 
Following his Kauwaeranga decision, Fenton continued to urge upon McLean the need 
for an appeal or legislation to settle the issue of Maori rights in the foreshore. 41 In turn, 
McLean sought the advice of the Attorney­General: should the case be removed to the 
Supreme Court and did the Native Land Court have jurisdiction to make such award? 
McLean also wondered: 42 
if... the Government would be justified in accepting from the natives a deed of cession of the 
beach not recognising any absolute title, which might form a dangerous precedent; but giving 
compensation for the loss of fishing and other rights exercised by them over the foreshore. 
The Attorney­General's reply has not been located. 43 
The matter was aired in the press.  A correspondent to the Daily Southern Cross 
discussed the merits of foreshore claims and concluded: 44 
There is pressing necessity for the consideration of this question by the Assembly, and for the 
enactment of some law by which the rights in these cases would be clearly defined.  What is 
required is not an arbitrary enactment ignoring altogether native title to any part of the 
foreshore and excluding applications from the court, but such provision should be made, by 
defining plainly the question of what constitutes a valid claim to the foreshore, as will enable 
the court to decide any cases that may arise. The Assembly has hitherto ignored this subject, 
although attention has been repeatedly drawn to it.  Partly no doubt this has arisen from the 
many difficulties which surround the subject, but another session should not be allowed to 
pass without the whole question being considered. 
As it happened, events at Coromandel soon obliged the Government to take action. 
It is unsurprising that the partial success of the Kauwaeranga claimants and the sums 
being offered by the government encouraged other foreshore claims in the Hauraki area. 
Further north, at Coromandel, the beach had also been pegged out by miners. 45 Much of 
the adjacent land had passed out of Maori hands through old land claims and the 
41 Fenton to McLean, undated, MS Papers 32, folder 267, Alexander Turnbull Library. 
42 McLean to the Attorney­General, 1 April 1871, No 111/1, MA 4/14, pp 354­355, National 
Archives. 
43 See Baker to the Native Minister ­ 17 April 1871, MA 4/14,  351, National Archives.  This enclosed 
an opinion of the Attorney­General on Fenton's decision which was expected to answer the Native 
Minister's enquiries. 
44 Daily Southern Cross, 17 April 1872. 
45 Daily Southern Cross, 17 April 1872.
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Crown's purchase of the Patapata block in 1857.  At least two blocks fronting the harbour, 
Te Ngorongoro and Te Umuhau, were still in Maori ownership in 1871.   These blocks 
were brought before the Court in June.  The surveys of both contained portions of the 
adjoining mudflat down to low water mark.  The Court ordered certificates that excluded 
the mudflat below ordinary high tides.  It advised the applicants that if they wished the 
mudflat to be investigated they must put in a separate claim afterwards. 46 Further 
claims, apparently to a larger area of mudflat, were duly heard in May 1872. 47 J C 
MacCormick appeared for the Crown and produced a proclamation suspending the 
Court's jurisdiction over land below high water in the Province of Auckland.  The 
Government, he explained: 48 
...think it necessary to the public good to suspend for a time the hearing of these claims to the 
foreshore at Coromandel.  It is considered that if these portions of the foreshore were given to 
the natives a great wrong would be done to the people living at Coromandel, and particularly 
to the Europeans who own land there fronting the harbour.  It would not be right for the 
natives, after they have sold the land bounded by the sea­shore, to come now and ask to have 
the right to use the sea­shore taken away from those persons and given to the natives alone, as 
the claimants here are doing.  This is a new thing, this claiming the use of the sea shore for the 
natives only; it was not heard of before gold was found on the beach, and the Government must 
take time to consider which is best to be done both for the Maori and the European in the 
matter.  It may be necessary that the question of what is to be done with all claims by the 
natives to the seashore should be considered in the General Assembly, where there will be 
natives to take part in the deliberations upon it.  I am, therefore, instructed to impress upon the 
natives that the hearing of these claims is only deferred, not refused; and that the Government have 
not the wish, as they certainly have not the power, to deprive the natives of any just rights they 
may have to the foreshore. 
MacCormick offered to pay the reasonable expenses of the Maori who had come to 
Auckland for the case, but warned "they must distinctly understand the Government do 
not acknowledge any claim." 49 McLean's reason for this step was that: 50 
it appeared that these claims were only the forerunners of others likely to be put forth 
extending over a much wider area, and embracing so large an extent of property that with a 
46 Native Land Court, Coromandel Minute Book 2, pp  208­209. 
47 The applications for the Coromandel foreshore blocks nos. 1­5 were advertised in the Kahiti on 13 
and 27 December 1871. 
48 Daily Southern Cross, 16 May 1872.  Italics added. 
49 Above n 48. 
50 In Re The Ninety­Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461, 479.  The original source has not been identified.
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view to the necessary protection of the important interests involved it was desirable to place 
such restrictions as were allowed by law upon the action of the court pending the passing of a 
declaratory Act by the Legislature. 
The New Zealand Herald called for immediate action from the government.  If the 
claims succeeded, "any person walking over any portion of this foreshore would become 
a trespasser." 51 The Herald cited a "well known legal treatise" that doubted the legitimacy 
of private titles to the foreshore.  It also questioned Fenton's assessment of the evidence in 
Kauwaeranga. 
J C MacCormick came to the court's defence in the next issue. He noted that in 
Whakaharatau, Fenton had decided against the claimant because no exclusive right of use 
had been proved.  But in Kauwaeranga, the claimants "were not wanting with the evidence 
required, and, as lawyers sometimes say, swore up to the mark, while, unfortunately, no 
counsel was employed on behalf of the Crown to cross­examine them." 52 
Fenton was therefore obliged to take the facts sworn to as proven.  Moreover, the 
Shortland Beach Act 1869, which MacCormick considered "a very impolitic and 
unadvised measure" appeared to "have recognised certain rights in the natives to the 
Shortland Beach." 53 He did not think that Kauwaeranga would be treated as a precedent 
by the court, at least outside the boundaries affected by the Act. 
The Herald accepted that there was a significant difference between the Thames and 
Coromandel cases: 54 
The natives had not alienated their land at Grahamstown and Shortland; but they have 
alienated the greater portion of their lands abutting on Coromandel harbour.  In all such cases, 
we hold that the foreshore belongs of right to the Crown... When we state that among the 
claims to be heard by the Native Lands court is one to the foreshore at Preece's Point, for which 
land a Crown grant was issued in 1842, our meaning will be clear.  If this claim holds good, a 
similar claim would hold good for any portion of the harbour of Auckland. 
The paper remained sceptical of the authenticity of the Coromandel claims, and 
repeated its caution to the Native Land Court: 55 
51 New Zealand Herald, 15 April 1872. 
52 NZ Herald, 16 April 1872. 
53 Above n 52. 
54 Above n 52. 
55 Above n 52.  Italics in original.
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The Judges... will also pardon us for suggesting that it would be well to consider the 
probabilities in determining the truth of any statement. It is hardly probable, that if a native 
owned such a valuable property as the exclusive right to use a portion of the sea shore as a 
fishery, no one should hear of it for a period of thirty years, and then only when a goldfield was 
discovered in the immediate vicinity. 
The Daily Southern Cross, which had considered that the Maori claims at Kauwaeranga 
were fair, also saw serious consequences arising from the Coromandel applications: 56 
The Coromandel claims introduce a feature that has not before cropped up, and will show 
those of our readers who are not acquainted with the nature and effect of those beach claims 
how important they are.  A very large portion of the beach which is the subject of the pending 
actions, fronts land purchased by private individuals years ago, and over which the native title 
has altogether been extinguished.  The township of Kapanga is one portion of this property. 
Now, supposing that this township had been extensively built upon, and the native claims to 
the beach were subsequently recognised, the entrance to the place would have been completely 
blocked up.  Indeed there is nothing to prevent such claims being made for portions of the 
beach abutting on the Waitemata harbour, and when it is considered how easy it might be for 
the natives to prove that their ancestors had fishing grounds in Mechanics', St George's, Judge's, 
or Freeman's Bay, we cannot be at all certain that such claims will not actually be made, unless 
the law is so framed as to render such claims inadmissible.  We believe the Government are 
preparing to deal with this grave question, and that the bill will be brought forward next 
session of the Assembly.  The question is altogether a difficult one to deal with, for, while it is 
necessary that the public interests involved should be stringently protected, it would be unfair 
under all the circumstances to deprive the natives of their rights to fisheries which may be of 
great value to them.  We think, however, that whatever provision may be made in the bill for 
the recognition of such rights it should be held that wherever the natives have disposed of land 
abutting upon the seashore, whether by sale or otherwise to the Crown or to private 
individuals, such alienation should be regarded as a tacit relinquishment of all claim to the 
beach in front of the property disposed of, unless there was a distinct understanding to the 
contrary at the time of the sale. 
A declaratory act was drawn up, though not introduced.  No copy has been located 
and the content of the Bill must be deduced from MacCormick's letter to McLean 
enclosing a draft "to provide for claims by natives to the sea­shore." 57 McLean had 
56 Daily Southern Cross, 16 May 1872. 
57 J C  MacCormick to McLean, 11 July 1872, MS 32, folder 406, Alexander Turnbull Library. 
Underlining in original.  Fenton seems to have included clauses dealing with foreshores and 
auriferous lands in his draft Native Lands bill.  He suggested to McLean that these remain in the 
draft because "I don't know what is the mind of the government on these questions."  Fenton to 
McLean 8 June (or January) [1871?], MS Papers 32, folder 267, Alexander Turnbull Library.
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apparently suggested that while the measure "should provide for any real claims which 
the natives might have it should not invite claims." 58 If passed in its existing form 
MacCormick was sure it would "do full justice to the natives & at the same time prevent 
their claims being made the means of robbing the public for the benefit of pakeha 
speculators."  He added: 59 
I have made the provisions of the Bill as general as possible so that it should not be said it was 
directed against the natives.  Clauses 14 to 20 provide for the granting of the fore­shore in 
certain cases & they will apply to natives holding land under the Crown as well as to British 
subjects.  These clauses can of course be omitted from the Bill if there were any danger of the 
passing of the Bill being defeated by their remaining, but I think it desirable they should stand 
& the Superintendent [of Auckland Province] approves of them. 
There are risks in drawing inferences from such a brief description, but it is likely that 
the Bill asserted the Crown's general right to property in the foreshore ­ at least where 
native title over the dry ground was extinguished ­ while authorising grants to be made 
in special circumstances.  Maori "holding land under the Crown" might qualify for such 
grants, which suggests that ownership of adjoining land was a prerequisite. 
McLean's failure to introduce the Bill was possibly related to the temporary ousting of 
the Fox ministry ­ of which he was a member ­ in September 1872.  Foreshore rights were 
still exercising the Government in March of the next year, when Fox (in McLean's 
absence) requested Fenton: 60 
To make the following enquiry from the Judges of your Court and report the result to this office 
at your earliest convenience. 
Do they, or any, and which of them, decide that lands below high water mark are Native lands, 
though such lands are adjacent to lands over which the Native Title has been extinguished by 
previous cession to the Crown, ­ and, if so, on what grounds? 
Do they, or any, and which of them, in any case decide that lands below high water mark are 
Native lands and find Natives entitled thereto and grant certificates for such lands? 
Gisborne's correspondence to McLean reveals that he and James Prendergast were involved in 
considering the draft bill on foreshores. 
58 Above n 57. Underlining in original. 
59 Above n 57. 
60 G S  Cooper to Fenton, 29 March 1873, MA 4/17, National Archives.
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Fenton's reply appears not to have survived. 61 It is reasonable to suppose, however, 
that the Land Court judges would not award rights to Maori when the adjoining land had 
passed from their hands. The later history of the Coromandel claims would suggest that 
this was so. If the reply to Fox's inquiry was along these lines, the Government may have 
decided that legislation was unnecessary and the court could continue to award fishing 
rights in appropriate cases where Maori retained the adjacent land. 
It has been contended that the 1872 Proclamation reflected alarm at the implications of 
Kauwaeranga, and that it blocked the Coromandel claims and destroyed a jurisdiction that 
might have recognised legitimate Maori claims. 62 These interpretations are questionable. 
The proclamation was avowedly a temporary measure that was not intended to frustrate 
further Maori claims.  It lapsed when the Native Lands Act 1873 came into effect. 63 
Despite the concern about Maori claims abutting European land, the Government 
authorised the purchase of the Coromandel foreshore in 1874.  This seems to have been 
an act of expediency to remove any opposition to the mining of the mudflat.  The sums 
paid to the claimants were certainly more modest; over the next four years around £200 
was spent in extinguishing their claims. 64 
In 1879 the Crown applied to have its interest in the Coromandel foreshore defined by 
the Native Land Court.  Judge Monro deferred the matter, preferring that Fenton hear the 
case and suggesting that the claimants also make an application.  This caused some 
embarrassment to the Land Purchase Agent, G T  Wilkinson, who had brought some 
claimants from Waiheke to complete the Crown's title. 65 
The Crown's application was heard again on 30 November 1881 and dismissed.  No 
minute of this hearing has been located.  The only record of the case merely states: 
"Native title not found." 66 As the court had power to determine the Crown's interest in 
any piece of land, the likely explanation for this result is that any Maori interest in the 
61 See register entry at MA 1 1873/2003, National Archives.  Judge Monro also replied and Judge 
Smith indicated that he had "never adjudicated."  MA 1 1873/2342 and 1873/2560, National 
Archives. 
62 Muriwhenua Fishing Report, para 5.4.1.  Evidence of A  Ward, WAI 27, AA 26, pp  8, 38. 
63 In Re the Ninety­Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461, 474.  R Boast describes the revocation as inadvertent. 
Above n 7 152. There seems to be no evidence that this was so, and MacCormick made it clear in 
1872 that the prohibition was not to be permanent.  The later handling of the Coromandel claims 
shows that Crown employees were aware that the Court's jurisdiction had been restored. 
64 NLP 78/1426 in MA/MLP 1 82/5, National Archives. 
65 G T Wilkinson telegram to R J Gill, 20 November 1879, MA MLP 1 82/5, National Archives. 
66 MLC­A 1/27, 102, National Archives Auckland.
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foreshore was deemed to be extinguished by purchases of the adjoining land. 67 Shortly 
afterwards the Native Minister brought the Crown application to the attention of the 
Chief Judge, but there is no record of further action on the matter. 68 There were, 
however, several Maori applications for portions of the Coromandel foreshore in 1886. 
These were dismissed for lack of the necessary plans. 69 A further application by Wiremu 
Taipua in 1889 was adjourned at his request.  The outcome of his claim has not been 
discovered. 70 
V LATER DEVELOPMENTS 
It is hard to assess awareness of the Hauraki foreshore cases among Maori in other 
parts of the country.  There is some evidence that the Kauwaeranga decision was 
reasonably well known.  In the far south of the country, Riverton Maori made reference 
to the Thames awards when asserting ownership of the foreshore opposite their reserve 
in 1874.  They argued that the reserves in the Murihiku block were lands over which 
native title had never been extinguished, therefore they possessed an exclusive right to 
the adjoining foreshore. 71 
Wi Parata also alluded to the Thames awards when he claimed the Porirua foreshore 
in 1880.  His application covered some hundreds of acres of mudflat in the southern part 
of the harbour, opposite land that had been set apart for Maori under the 1847 Porirua 
purchase. 72 The case was delayed for various reasons and judgment was given by Chief 
Judge MacDonald in 1883.  Although his decision noted the lack of opposition from the 
Crown, he had prevented Alexander Mackay from producing the New Zealand 
Company deeds to the area. 73 He found that the applicants had been accustomed to 
gathering pipis, but had exercised no other rights: 74 
67 Native Land Amendment Act 1877, s 6. 
68 See draft letter 397/4 in MA/MLP 1 82/5, National Archives. 
69 Native Land Court, Coromandel Minute Book 4, 50. 
70 Native Land Court, Coromandel Minute Book 5,  33. 
71 See Alexander Mackay's report on the dispute, [1874] AJHR G­5C, 1­2. There had apparently some 
threat to fence the foreshore opposite the reserve.  Telegram to Horomona Parata, no 435, MA 5/2, 
National Archives. 
72 Native Land Court, Wellington Minute Book 1, 74,75, 83,102.  ML Plan 496, LINZ, Wellington. 
73 Native Land Court, Wellington Minute Book 1, 157.  It is hard to see the relevance of these since 
the extinction of native title ultimately rested on the Porirua purchase in 1847. 
74 Native Land Court, Wellington Minute Book 1, 157­158.
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Under these circumstances if the judgment of the court in the matter of the Shortland foreshore 
be correct and it has not been impeached it is clear that the present applicants are entitled not 
to the land but to a right of fishery, the collection of pipis being taken by the judgment referred 
to as a "fishery" and so this court finds. 
Though this court incidentally finds as above ie  that the applicants are entitled to an 
incorporeal hereditament it yet remains to be shown that the court has any jurisdiction to deal 
with the Title thereto. 
Kauwaeranga did not, however, produce a spate of foreshore cases.  This was despite a 
high level of concern about foreshore issues in the north of the country during the late 
1870s and 1880s.  The Hauraki claims themselves were limited to discrete portions of the 
foreshore rather than long areas of coastline.  They concerned those portions where the 
recognition of an interest was likely to yield a pecuniary reward because of the presence 
of gold. 
VI FENTON ELABORATES HIS PRINCIPLE 
Fenton enlarged on the principle he had laid down in Kauwaeranga when appearing 
before the Native Affairs Committee in 1880.  When asked about the practice of the court 
in dealing with fisheries he replied: 75 
The rule of law [laid down by the Court] is simply this ­ when I say rule of law I mean Maori 
common law ­ that where a native, native family, or tribe, have established as matter of fact the 
exclusive exercise of rights of fishing in any locality, and have maintained it against others in 
the old days, that is before British law was established in the Island, then we have given a title 
to those rights as an easement.  We have never recognised any rights below the surface, but 
simply an easement, and the easement in this case I suppose would be the right to use the 
surface of the soil and all above it, but nothing below it, and excluding others from interfering 
with those rights...  I do not remember that I have ever had a case below low water mark, 
although I think it is quite possible that such exist.  I remember there is a rock to the North of 
Waiheke which is a great fishing ground for whapuka [sic], and I am aware that the Ngatipaoa 
defended that ground against attacks from the North.  I cannot say that the Court has decided 
that case, or that it has decided any such... 
Sir William Fox Would you apply that doctrine to the sea beach as well as to a tidal river or 
mud­flat?  I do not think I would, but I should not say so decidedly. 
Have you ever done so? ­ No, I have not.  There is a valuable shell fishery on the West Coast 
between Hokianga and Kaipara called Toheroa, where the natives obtain a large clam.  That 
75 Petition of Mahurehure Tribe, LE 1/1880/6, National Archives.  Cited in T  Walzl, WAI 27, Z­49, 
89.
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fishery is of great value to them, but whether they have exercised rights of property to the 
exclusion of others I do not know, but that is the essence of their title to my judgment.  They 
must prove exclusive  use. 
Several weeks later the Committee investigated a complaint that a fishery right 
awarded as an easement by Fenton to Ngai Tahu in 1868 had been impaired by drainage. 
Fenton appeared again and explained that in his view the injury to these fisheries was 
wrongful.  He thought that the drainage should give rise to compensation or a remedy at 
law. 76 
These later statements suggest a number of points.  In order for the Court to award 
rights in the foreshore some tangible act of appropriation must be proved.  Fenton 
insisted that the test was exclusive use, implying that casual or "public" use of an area 
would not be sufficient. 77 This approach finds parallels in the distinction that Maori in 
the nineteenth century often drew between the exercise of a right and the performance of 
an activity that had no proprietary significanc.  Certain beaches might thus be regarded 
as a common highway. 78 Material on a beach that had no recognised value might not be 
subject to claim by any particular party.  Thomas Chapman, of the Church Missionary 
Society recorded in 1852 that two rival chiefs had laid claim to a reef of rock lying off a 
river mouth because they sought "the distinctive merit" of supplying stones from it for a 
church.  "All parties are surprised", he wrote, "because such a thing as claiming loose 
stones on the beach was never before heard of." 79 
The taking of pipis was often portrayed by Maori as an act of little consequence, either 
because the resource was so abundant in some places or the gatherers were mere 
transients.  It might be tolerated by the real owners of a location without compromising 
their claims to the land.  Examples from around the North Island might be given, 
although one need not look beyond the Kauwaeranga evidence for illustration.  "As to 
pipis", explained Taipari, "... it was a general rule in former times that any one could 
consume them.... All strangers were allowed to gather pipis in former days..." 80 In 
76 Petition of Te Oti Pita Mutu and others, LE 1/1880/6, National Archives.  Cited in Walzl, above n 
75. 
77 This standard was applied by the Maori Appellate Court in the later case of Ngakororo 12 
Auckland NAC Minute Book 137. 
78 For example, Native Land Court, Maketu Minute Book 2, pp  285, 288.  E  Stokes A History of 
Tauranga County, (Dunmore, Palmerston North, 1980) 124. William Yate Journal, 9 January 1834, 
MS 1833­45, Alexander Turnbull Library. 
79 Thomas Chapman Journal, 16 February 1852, Alexander Turnbull Library. 
80 Native Land Court, Hauraki Minute Book 4  218, 220.
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Whakaharatau, Te Wahapu testified: "We use the adjoining lands for fishing purposes with 
Ngati Whanaunga and Ngati Maru's.  We did not suffer persons to use nets on that land, 
but allowed them to gather pipis." 81 
At the other end of the scale, such acts as the imposition of rahui, the naming of a 
shellfish bed, the staking of nets, or the taking of waterbirds were unequivocal marks of 
ownership. 82 Fenton's requirement of exclusive use therefore had some parallels in 
custom, and cannot be easily dismissed as an application of Dr Arnold's doctrines to 
marine property.  The practical result of Fenton's test was that court would not recognise 
Maori rights as being co­extensive with the entire coastline, but rights would be protected 
if a suitable act of ownership was established. 
Fenton's evidence in 1880 suggests that he was unaware of the effect that would later 
be attributed to section 147 of the Harbours Act 1878.  This section prohibited any grant 
of the foreshore except by special act.  The Court of Appeal held in Ninety­Mile Beach that 
this removed the power of the Native Land Court to investigate title or issue a freehold 
title below high water mark.  Fenton's successor, J E  MacDonald was also oblivious to 
this change, having awarded rights to the Porirua foreshore in 1883.  Given the Court's 
willingness to apply the Kauwaeranga principle after 1878, the Harbours Act was unlikely 
to pose a practical deterrent to further foreshore claims in the nineteenth century and 
cannot explain the small number of such claims after Kauwaeranga. There might also have 
been room for doubt that the kind of right awarded by the Court was a grant, disposition 
or conveyance of the foreshore in terms of the section. 83 
VII SHOULD FENTON HAVE AWARDED A FEE SIMPLE TITLE? 
Fenton has been criticised for awarding a right of fishery rather than the fee simple in 
the foreshore.  It has been said that the result in Kauwaeranga was a retreat from the 
reasoning in Whakaharatau and the earlier practice of the Court (an argument dealt with 
above) and was dictated by considerations of policy or politics.  According to the 
81 Native Land Court, Hauraki Minute Book 4 192. 
82 For further discussion of these issues see evidence of F Sinclair, WAI 167, C­10,  39­46, and A 
Ballara "The Origins of Ngati Kahungunu", PhD thesis, Victoria University of Wellington 1991, 
347. 
83 The assumption that the Court's jurisdiction was entirely removed in 1878 was later to deprive 
Ngati Toa of the protection which the 1883 Porirua decision might otherwise have provided.  In 
the twentieth century, their objection to the reclamation of the Porirua mudflat was ignored on the 
ground that the 1883 award was ultra vires.  LE 1/1960/12, National Archives.
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Muriwhenua Fishing Report: "The convenience of the Kauwaeranga Judgment was that it 
protected the Crown's interest in gold, which was the main concern at the time." 84 
Several earlier events appear to have shaped Fenton's attitude to the Thames 
applications.  While Resident Magistrate in Kaipara in 1855, Fenton had been asked to 
settle a dispute about toheroas.  The fishery in question had many years earlier been a 
cause of conflict between Ngati Whatua and Ngapuhi, with the "undisputed possession" 
ultimately being yielded to the former.  The issue had arisen again because large 
quantities of toheroa were being taken for consumption by European station hands. 
Fenton advised that: 85 
[t]he Ngatiwhatua have made a demand for annual payment by way of rent ­ The Europeans, 
supported by Ngapuhi, aver that the fishery, being below high water mark of the ocean, is the 
property of the Crown; and after various discussions amongst themselves the matter has been 
left to my decision.  I confess myself unwilling to decide the question without reference to high 
authority though I am inclined to think that the Treaty of Waitangi would confirm the 
Ngatiwhatua in the enjoyment of a right, which they seem for many years previous to the 
establishment of British sovereignty to have exercised uncontested. 
There is, in this tentative response, a hint of the Kauwaeranga finding that the Treaty 
would oblige recognition of an exclusive right of fishery, though Fenton still seemed 
undecided about rights to toheroa in his 1880 evidence. 
Nearer in time to Kauwaeranga, in 1868 Fenton had awarded fishing "easements" over 
areas of Crown land within the Kemp purchase in the South Island. 86 This shows he had 
already applied the idea of an exclusive right that did not depend on ownership of the 
underlying soil.  Fenton was also prepared to admit a public right of way over the areas 
covered by the easements, which again finds a parallel in Kauwaeranga. In 1868 he had 
also sat on the Orakei case, and heard considerable evidence about the significance of 
shark fisheries for claims to land.  This background may well have prompted Fenton's 
questions about shark fisheries during the Kauwaeranga case.  There was an indication in 
1869 that Fenton already thought that, while the Maori claim to ownership of the 
84 Muriwhenua Fishing Report para 5.4.5.  New Zealand Law Commission Preliminary Paper No  9: 
The Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Fisheries (1989) 16.  A Crown grant of the foreshore would not 
affect the Crown's claims to gold in any case. 
85 IA 1 1855/202, National Archives.  Cited in Law Commission Preliminary Paper No 9 "The Treaty 
of Waitangi and Maori Fisheries" 145. 
86 A  Mackay "A Compendium of Official Documents Relative to Native Affairs in the South Island" vol  2, 
210­216.  His jurisdiction to do so was conferred by an Order of Reference under the Native Lands 
Act 1867.  See the Ngai Tahu Reference Validation Act 1868.
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foreshore was doubtful, "the fishery right undoubtedly did exist." 87 We know also from 
his own statements in the Legislative Council that he believed gold on Maori or private 
land remained vested in the Crown. 88 
Some of these strands were woven into the Kauwaeranga decision.  Certain key 
elements ­ the Treaty protection of fisheries and the translation of such rights into an 
easement or exclusive right of fishery ­ already formed part of the Chief Judge's thinking 
before he was called upon to decide a case involving auriferous foreshore land. 
The Native Land Court regularly decided claims to terra firma on the basis of hunting 
and gathering rights exercised on the land.  If such rights translated to a fee simple 
interest in dry land, why was the act of fishing held to warrant a lesser interest in the 
foreshore?   Fenton confessed his uncertainty about the interest he should award, and 
expected that the question would be decided by the Supreme Court or Parliament.  He 
considered that the distinction lay in the separate mention of fisheries in the Treaty.  The 
Native Lands Act required him to decide the "right title estate or interest" of claimants "to 
or in the land" before him, but he doubted that he would have jurisdiction over land 
beneath the sea were it not for the specific guarantee of fisheries.  The fact that fisheries 
were separately mentioned suggested to Fenton that such rights were of a different 
quality from rights to dry land.  This, together with the public interests involved, led him 
to hold that the fishery right should be upheld but not the claim to fee simple. 
The Chief Judge thus followed a middling course.  The fisheries guarantee 
encouraged him to think that he had jurisdiction below high water mark ­ and, indeed, to 
contemplate a jurisdiction below low water mark.  But he held that the apparent 
distinction between lands and fisheries meant that these could not be regarded in the 
same light. Kauwaeranga therefore represents a middle position between the view that 
"land" in the Native Lands Act did not mean land covered by the sea, and the view that 
the Court had jurisdiction to award full title above and below high water mark.  The 
more conservative position, that "land" meant "lands in the ordinary acceptation of the 
word", is one that the terms of the Act might easily have supported. 89 Guided by 
87 See statement by F D Bell, (1 Sept 1869) 6 NZPD 905. 
88 (17 July 1869) 6 NZPD 96. 
89 The phrase is J C  MacCormick's.  He remained privately opposed to the Court exercising any 
jurisdiction over fisheries and foreshores. McCormick thought that it was never "the intention of 
the Legislature in creating Native Land Courts to give them jurisdiction to entertain such 
applications.  Both the history of the legislation relating to native lands and the general scope of 
the Native Land Acts... point to a different conclusion." Daily Southern Cross, 18 April 1872.  See 
also MacCormick to Fenton, 16 August 1871, [1871] AJHR A­2A,  21.  The overall philosophy of the 
first Native Lands Acts ­ the conversion of Maori proprietary customs to titles derived from the
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wording of the Treaty, Fenton was persuaded to go further, but not to the extent of 
exercising the Court's ordinary jurisdiction below high water.  He acknowledged the 
maxim that "the honour of the King is to be preferred to his profit", but thought: 90 
there can be no failure of justice if the natives have secured to them the full, exclusive, and 
undisturbed possession of all the rights and privileges over the locus in quo which they or their 
ancestors have ever exercised... 
Whatever opinion one forms of this reasoning, it is hard to see that Kauwaeranga 
resulted in much "convenience" to the Crown or made any practical difference to events 
at the Thames.  The Crown was committed by its own policy and the Gold Fields Act to 
treat with Maori before opening the Thames foreshore to mining. Because fisheries 
easements were intended to have legal protection from interference, the Kauwaeranga 
awards would themselves have been a bar to mining before Maori claims had been 
satisfied. The sums offered by the government to cancel those claims were not reduced by 
the Court's decision.  By the standards of the time, the amount finally paid was high, 
especially when compared with ordinary purchases of land in the district. 91 
VIII THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAND AND FORESHORE RIGHTS 
An important question arising from the debate over the Thames and Coromandel 
claims is the reasonableness of holding that exclusive Maori rights in the foreshore 
depended on Maori maintaining possession of the adjoining land.  A full study of this 
matter would be a lengthy task, but it may be helpful to sample the kind of evidence that 
would need to be considered. 
The sources speak of an intimate connection between ownership of land and rights 
exercised, or acts done, along the coastline.  Points in the sea were sometimes included in 
the recitation of rohe.   Guns, boulders, or even a child cast into the water might be 
offered as a proof of who owned the land. 92 At Hokianga, the blood of a chief was 
Crown (or assimilated as nearly as possible to ownership of land according to British law) ­ might 
also have justified the conservative position. 
90 A  Frame "Kauwaeranga Judgment" (1984) 14 VUWLR 227, 245. 
91 It is true that much larger sums were soon invested ­ or perhaps risked ­ in mining the mudflat. 
Large­scale investment and, in some instances, large profits were also a feature of mining on the 
land nearby.  As Maori were not actively engaged in this kind of mining, the real issue is not the 
awards of the Court but the appropriateness of the Crown exercising pre­emptive control over 
auriferous land. (E W Puckey  defended the payment of £1,500 to Rapana by observing that 
£50,000 had been spent on developing this part of the beach.  Puckey to Colonial Secretary, 22 May 
1873,  AP 2/21, National Archives.) 
92 For example, Native Land Court, Northern Minute Book 2,  90; Waiapu Minute Book 7, 301; 
Gisborne Minute Book 1,  223.
160 (1999) 29 VUWLR 
dispersed in the water "for the express purpose of claiming the land ­ a Maori custom". 93 
The erection of rahui and the claiming of stranded whales were powerful symbols of 
ownership. 94 So too was the assertion of a right of fishery.  The case of Waihi No 6, 
involving land in the Maketu estuary, illustrates the point.  A portion of the claim was 
disputed on the grounds that other parties had taken pipis there and made use of certain 
gravel pits.  But the claimants could show strong acts of ownership.  Their chief, Winiata, 
had established a rahui to control the taking of birds, and they had staked their nets in the 
river over a lengthy period: 95 
According to Maori custom kirikiri [gravel] is common property... Winiata had taro growing 
there[,] he would not object to any one getting kirikiri on his land.  If a person was to stake nets 
on another persons land the owner of the land would probably destroy them or send them 
away.  If Winiata had been a stranger and placed his stakes there it would amount to taking 
possession of the land.  Winiata asserts his right to this south end in consequence of his setting 
up his Rahui and staking his nets. 
Unlike the taking of pipis or gravel, the erection of fishing stakes signified a 
proprietary claim.  The reasoning advanced here is that if Winiata had not been the 
owner of the adjoining land, he would have been opposed.  As he had not been, the land 
must be his ­ the implication being that the owner of such rights to the foreshore and the 
owner of the land must be the same party.  A similar view was expressed by Hori Ngatai 
at Tauranga in 1885.  He told the Native Minister: 96 
... with regard to the land below high water mark immediately in front of where I live, I consider 
that that is part and parcel of my own land... I will look upon the land below high water mark 
as being part of my own garden. 
Ownership of land conferred privileges that bear analogy with riparian rights.  In 
1874, in a protest against the granting of a timber­floating licence in the Kauwaeranga 
Stream, Hotoreni Taipari remarked: 97 
No payment was made to us for logs that lodged on our land in the year 1873 ­ according to 
Maori custom if fish or canoes or totara or kauri timber lodged on any person's land that would 
be his property, this was the custom all over the island, and although those things might be the 
property of a very great chief he would not get them again. 
93 Native Land Court, Northern Minute Book 4, 151. 
94 For example, Native Land Court, Gisborne Minute Book 4, 136; Napier Minute Book 13, 292. 
95 Native Land Court, Maketu Minute Book 2, 8ff. 
96 [1885] AJHR G­1, 60.  Emphasis added. 
97 AP 2/22/3512, National Archives.
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In conformity with this principle, Maori had demanded money for sawn kauri that 
had drifted onto the Thames mudflats in 1868. 98 Taipari's assertion about the widespread 
observance of this custom is borne out by the experience of missionaries in the far north 
of the country. 99 There is a suggestion that the same rule governed the allocation, as 
between owners of opposite banks, of stranded timber on the Tarawera River. 100 
The geographical association of aquatic and terrestrial property rights should not be 
thought of as a strict correlation.  In a hunting and gathering economy, which 
emphasised the ownership of particular resources, a rigid definition of territory was often 
unnecessary.  It was not until the advent of the land sale that the translation of such rights 
into ownership of defined boundaries became imperative. 101 Nevertheless, it seems to 
have been exceptional for exclusive rights in the foreshore to be held by parties other than 
those who possessed the adjoining land.  The natural assumption was that any such 
rights ran with the land (or were a proof of ownership of the land). 
Did the circumstances of land sales encourage Maori to think that this 
assumption would not apply?  There is some evidence that the effect of sales on foreshore 
rights had been considered even before annexation. The missionary, A N Brown, was 
told by two Maori in 1839 that when the Te Papa station had been bought the year before 
"...a cockle­bed in front of our settlement was not included, and that our Natives should 
no longer fetch shell­fish from thence unless they were paid for them." 102 This incident 
was one of a number of petty annoyances at this time ­ part of the station was being 
planted in potatoes to test how the missionaries would react, and some people alleged 
that they had been cheated out of payment by their friends.  Such behaviour was 
common when missions were established in areas that had little previous exposure to 
Europeans.  A period of testing was typical, and further payments would be sought on a 
range of pretexts.  Brown evidently saw the demands in this light and was "almost certain 
98 [1869] AJHR F­7, 15. 
99 Nathaniel Turner, in reporting the fate of the "Mercury", noted that the vessel was "driven with her 
stern on shore.  And according to New Zealand custom she became the lawful prize of the chief or 
party on whose coast she had grounded."  Turner Journal, qMS­2062,  106, Alexander Turnbull 
Library.  For a further illustration of the principle see John Hobbes Journal, 13 December 1840, MS 
612, Alexander Turnbull Library. 
100 Native Land Court, Whakatane Minute Book 1,  217. 
101 On occasions, the Native Land Court made provision for the overlapping of rights to the coastline. 
See, for example, the Awapuni decision, Important Judgments Delivered in the Compensation Court 
and Native Land Court 1866­79, (Auckland, 1879) 147.  For a similar result involving a freshwater 
fishery, see Native Land Court, Northern Minute Book 10, decision in Omapere No 3, 226. 
102 A N Brown journal, 20 August 1839, Micro MS Coll 4, CN/M11, 517­518, Alexander Turnbull 
Library.  For further discussion of such incidents see F  Sinclair, WAI 45,  I­3.
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that in these squabbles the Natives will ultimately give up their unreasonable demands, 
after a long waste of time and giving them some trifling." 103 
Brown's experience at Tauranga suggests that foreshore rights might well be an issue 
as the parties came to terms with the implications of sale.  In districts with a longer 
history of contact, the kind of annoyances suffered by Brown had become rare.  In the 
Bay of Islands, where land sales had been extensive, the physical problem of gaining 
access to the coastline was already becoming apparent.  The CMS missionaries felt 
obliged to purchase an area along the Kerikeri River and place it in trust for Maori, "as it 
is the last part of the river which is not sold where shell fish can be procured." 104 Nearer 
Waitangi, Ngati Rahiri apparently lacked a place to live ­ as of right ­ while they fished 
and took pipis, until Henry Williams made over land at Te Ti by deed of gift in 1839. 105 
These examples may not shed much light on the narrow issue of whether sales were 
thought to affect the foreshore, but they do suggest that sales posed a practical 
impediment to enjoyment of the coastline, even at this early date. 
The concern to reserve aquatic rights, or at least the right of access, was a feature of 
some sales after annexation.  In 1853, McLean encountered resistance to his purchase of 
land in the Wairarapa until the vendors were assured that the sale would not prejudice 
their right to the eel fisheries in Lake Wairarapa. 106 Other purchases of this time, such as 
the Ahuriri and Wanganui transactions, expressly stipulated that certain rights of access 
or fishery remained.  The Ahuriri deed contained a clause reserving to Maori "an equal 
right" to fish, shellfish and other productions of the sea, together with a right to land 
canoes at places to be specified.  This had been inserted to allay the fear of Tareha and 
other chiefs that they might eventually be deprived of these rights. Ten years later, Tareha 
said that he had sold only to high water mark and therefore owned land that was being 
reclaimed from Ahuriri lagoon. 107 Apparently he did not pursue the matter. 108 The 
purchase in 1853 of islands in the Papakura Creek (Manukau) was expressly limited to 
103 Above n 102, 518. 
104 R  Davis journal, 7 August 1839, Micro MS Coll 4, CN/M11, 31, Alexander Turnbull Library. 
105 See evidence of John Williams, Native Land Court, Northern Minute Book 10, 165­166, 356ff  and 
judgments at Northern Minute Book 10, p  170, and Northern Minute Book 11, 35.  For pipi 
gathering contrasted with shark fishing, see evidence of Hori Wihana, Northern Minute Book 11, 
17. 
106 [1891] AJHR  session 2, G­4, 3, 24. 
107 Te Whanganui a Orotu Report, 92. 
108 This incident bears comparison with Tareha's claim to gravel in the Meanee River.  He appears to 
have let this claim drop as well.  J L  Lambton Carter to McLean, 29 November 1862, MS 32, 
Alexander Turnbull Library. Hawke's Bay Times, 4 December 1862.
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high water mark.  The exclusion was evidently thought unusual; the Surveyor­General 
noted on the deed that "[t]he natives insisted on this being specified, intending thereby to 
retain the right of putting down the stakes for their nets when fishing." 109 
The language of alienation at this time supports the view that, in general, the sea was 
not traditionally regarded as property.  The image of sending the land sold out to sea was 
sometimes used to express the act of transfer.  An illustration of this occurred during the 
purchase of Ngati Awa interests in the northern South Island in 1856.  McLean reported 
that one of the principal chiefs, Ropoama Te One, had expressed the finality of the 
alienation in various ways, including "their usual metaphor", namely: "...we have for ever 
launched this land into the sea." 110 Further examples can be found in discussions of 
land­selling in Taranaki. 111 This metaphor would make little sense if coastal boundaries 
were regarded as dividing the terrestrial property being conveyed from marine property 
that was being retained. 112 
Maori behaviour after land sales also suggests an appreciation that aquatic rights 
were affected by these transactions. Where rivers formed a boundary between Maori and 
European land, disputes occasionally arose over fishing or the right to stranded timber. 
On at least two occasions McLean resolved such disagreements by advocating a division 
of interests according to ownership of the banks ­ a rough­and­ready application of the ad 
medium filum principle. 113 Maori appear to have been satisfied with this solution.  As 
suggested above, it would seem to have conformed with the division of rights under the 
customary regime.  It further indicates an acceptance that sales implied some transfer of 
aquatic rights to the new owner, even if these had not been expressly stipulated in the 
deeds. 
This is reflected in the nature of claims that Maori would later bring to the foreshore. 
An example is Kawana Paipai's claim to part of the bed and foreshore of the Wanganui 
River.  Kawana was a very old chief, said to be "learned in Maori traditions and 
109 "Islands in Papakura Creek", 15 June 1853, Deed Number 266, Turton's Deeds, Manukau District, 
323. 
110 McLean to the Colonial Secretary, 7 April 1856, [1862] AJHR C­1,  366. 
111 See L F Head "Maori Land Boundaries" WAI 167, A­23, 53­57. 
112 A similar figure of speech might be used to express loss in other contexts.  For instance, Rapana 
wrote in 1869: "The miners' rights matter is all wrong.  It has fallen into the sea.  We have been 
searching for it, but have not found it."  The implication here was that the issue had been lost sight 
of, or that what was happening no longer made sense to the Maori at Hauraki.  New Zealand 
Herald, 24 July 1869, 5. 
113 See evidence of F  Sinclair, WAI 167, C­10, 25­30.  These incidents occurred on the Wanganui and 
Waikare Rivers.
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history". 114 Harbour works on the European side of the tidal reaches had apparently 
caused the river to erode part of his sections in the Putiki Reserve.  In 1871 he brought a 
claim that included one of his sections ­ Ngongohau No 1 ­ and the adjacent bed and 
foreshore out to the middle of the river.  Other leading figures included some smaller 
portions of foreshore in their applications.  The Court ordered the river bed to be 
excluded.  Undeterred, Kawana brought a similar application for some other sections in 
1873.  Although his map showed a claim to the middle of the river, he confined himself 
to asking for the foreshore only.  In the course of evidence, his son, Hori Kerei, alluded to 
the distinction, noted earlier, between the proprietary rights of the owner and "public" 
uses: 115 
[The land] has been cultivated by Kawana in the past but is now covered by water ­ the canoes 
of the iwi pass over ­ the beach is travelled over by everybody ­ all have a right ­ if there were 
pipis there my father only would have a right to them ­ he has refused to allow them to be 
taken from there. 
This application met the same fate as the first.  But the river bed claim is notable 
because of its obvious link with Kawana's ownership of the dry ground.  There was no 
suggestion that it symbolised a claim to the whole river, nor was there any hint of an 
overriding "tribal" right that conflicted with Kawana's private claim.  In the 
circumstances, his application implied that the other Putiki owners might make a similar 
argument, while the bed beyond the mid point had passed to the government by virtue of 
the Wanganui sale in 1848. 
Some other foreshore claims were likewise tailored to possession of land.  As a result 
of the 1855 earthquake, parts of the shoreline of Wellington Harbour were elevated and 
became dry land, including a considerable area in front of Pipitea Pa.  Ihaia Porutu laid 
claim to this ground in 1866 and it was apparently still the intention of the Pipitea people 
to assert ownership in 1867, when the pa was surveyed for a Land Court hearing.  But 
there was no general claim to the bed of the harbour at this time and nothing was said of 
other parts of the foreshore which had been reclaimed or become dry. 116 Similarly, the 
Porirua foreshore claim in 1880 corresponded to an area reserved in 1847.  It was not a 
claim to all the mudflats in the harbour. 
114 The Yeoman, 13 June 1884, 5. 
115 Native Land Court, Evidence of Hori Kerei Paipai, Ngongohau No 7, Wanganui Minute Book 1E, 
661.  A copy of the plan is annexed to WAI 167, C­10. 
116 MA 1/1866/409, 358, National Archives; Plan Number WD3140, LINZ, Wellington. 
MA1/1866/409 National Archives.
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The Riverton foreshore claim in 1874 was limited to land opposite a reserve.  Mackay 
noted in 1891 that Ngai Tahu sought the "sole right to fish along the sea frontage of their 
reserves where such lands abut the coast". 117 H K  Taiaroa's claim to the Mangahoe inlet 
on Otago Peninsula was consistent with this approach.  In 1877 he asked a question in the 
House concerning rights to this body of water.  Taiaroa noted that it was "situated in the 
midst of his land.  The lands adjacent to the place had all been granted."  He objected to 
Europeans plundering the oysters and fish and wished the Government to put a stop to 
this "until the Native title has been extinguished."  The Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report 
commented that Taiaroa "appeared to accept... that while a stop should be put to the 
practice until the Native title was extinguished the Europeans might be able to resume 
fishing thereafter." 118 The Coromandel claim in 1872 was thus unusual in including 
foreshore opposite European or Crown land, although it appears to have begun with 
claims to mudflats adjoining customary land. 
Two of the early petitions concerning the foreshore also admit a link between land 
ownership and foreshore rights.  Hoepa Mataitaua, of Te Kouma on the Coromandel 
Peninsula, protested in 1882 about the taking of oysters and shellfish by people from 
Australia and elsewhere.  He requested a law "to give the right of fishing on foreshores to 
the owners of the land abutting upon them." 119 More explicitly, Hone Peti and six others 
complained in 1884 about the taking of oysters at the mouth of the Mangonui River. 
They added that they "do not want oysters, &c., growing on the foreshore of Government 
lands; they merely wish what they are entitled to to be kept for themselves." 120 
In general, it seems that foreshore rights were not frequently discussed in the 
negotiation of the early coastal blocks.  If concerns about continued use had been raised, 
it may be that they were allayed by assurances about the public right of access and 
deemed unworthy of particular mention by the land purchase agents. Towards the end of 
the century, modification of the coastline by harbour boards and increasing exploitation 
of shellfish resources, especially oysters, were starting to cause unease.  These anxieties 
were voiced in speeches made to the Orakei parliament in 1879.  Some spoke in broad or 
even confused terms about the Treaty guarantee of fisheries, or complained that 
anchorage fees were not paid to them. Apihai Te Kawau said that he had only given land, 
not the sea: "...therefore the sea belongs to me.  Some of my goods are there.  I consider 
117 [1891] AJHR  G­7A, 7.  Cited in evidence of D  Armstrong, WAI 27, M­17. 
118 Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report, 168.  For Taiaroa's application see Native Land Court, South Island 
Minute Book 1B, 232, 15 September 1883. 
119 [1881] AJHR I­2, 27­28. 
120 [1884] AJHR session II, I­2, 16.
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the pipis and the fish are my goods." 121 Other chiefs were content to have protection of 
fisheries that abutted the land they retained.  Herewini Mauwi declared that his mana 
remained upon his land (some 7,000 acres) "because this land has not yet been 
surveyed.... Let me have the mana over that land alone; also, over the fisheries and pipi­ 
grounds therein." 122 
These grievances were still alive when the third session of the Orakei parliament was 
held in 1881.  The New Zealand Herald reported that "the Maoris have been very much 
annoyed by finding that the whole of the foreshore of Auckland harbour, even that 
opposite native land, has been conferred on the Harbour Board." 123 In his opening address, 
Paora Tuhaere stated that "the government had not adhered strictly to the Treaty by 
taking away the foreshore from native lands abutting on the sea..." 124 There was further 
discussion on the foreshore question the next day: 125 
With regard to the question of the fisheries and pipi banks, there was some debate, 
but a letter was read, showing that Judge Fenton would now settle that  question. 
It is not known what steps Fenton was expected to take.  If he made any proposal it is 
likely to have followed the principle laid down in Kauwaeranga and reiterated before the 
Native Affairs Committee two years earlier. 
About the same time as the third and final parliament at Orakei, there was a large hui 
at Waitangi at which foreshore rights were again raised.  The reports of the speeches 
contain little detail.  Wi Katene, sometime MHR for Northern Maori,  demanded: "Give 
us the seabed.  Let us reap the benefit of all fisheries according to the Treaty."  The Native 
Minister replied with these words: 126 
As to the foreshores and fisheries, I have heard a great deal about them, but do not quite 
understand what you are wanting.  The law of nations is that the great highway of nature, the 
foreshore, is reserved for the use of the whole, not individuals only.  Without a special vote of 
Parliament the foreshore belongs to the sovereignty for the use of both nations. 
121 [1879] AJHR G­8, 29. 
122 Above n 121, 20. 
123 New Zealand Herald, 12 March 1881.  Emphasis added. 
124 New Zealand Herald, 21 March 1881. Emphasis added. The foreshore opposite Ngati Whatua land 
at Orakei had been excluded from the Auckland Harbour Board endowment grant in 1869.  See 
[1869] AJHR F­7, 6; AAFV 997/A45, National Archives. 
125 New Zealand Herald, 22 March 1881. 
126 New Zealand Herald, 25 March 1881.
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Wi Katene clarified his request: 127 
Re pipi beds and fisheries, these were lost sight of.  I understand you to say the Crown takes the 
foreshore in trust for the people.  That is right in respect of, say, Russell, but our pipi beds are 
our own.  Should a town spring up here, what about our pipi beds? 
So far as one can tell, Katene believed that, while some pipi beds were undoubtedly 
retained by Maori, those in some localities were no longer their exclusive property. 
Where Europeans had bought land and settled, the foreshore was apparently regarded as 
public domain.  His concern was that if settlement spread closer to Maori land, there 
would be no means of protecting what he thought was rightfully their own. 
In 1886, Katene adopted a different stance in a petition claiming ownership of 
reclaimed land in Auckland and Wellington.  He contended that the pipi beds affected by 
these works "were not sold by them with the dry land adjoining".  The Native Affairs 
Committee did not support the petition, observing that "no proof of such exemption from 
any sale has been adduced." 128 A more numerously signed petition on the subject of 
reclamations met with a recommendation that the government should institute an inquiry 
into Maori rights to coastal fisheries. 129 
A deeper study of context would be required before one could confidently draw 
conclusions from the material sampled here.  The evidence reviewed does not tend 
entirely in one direction, but the general pattern supports the view that sales of land were 
understood to affect any exclusive rights in the foreshore.  This is broadly in line with the 
tentative conclusion of the Muriwhenua Fishing Report that fisheries associated with 
foreshores are "patently connected to the land", and might be affected by land sales. 130 
IX IS KAUWAERANGA A RECOGNITION OF "NON­TERRITORIAL 
ABORIGINAL TITLE" IN NEW ZEALAND? 
In his 1984 article on Maori fishing rights, Paul McHugh contended that Kauwaeranga 
acknowledged the existence, under the Native Lands Act, of a "vital distinction ... 
between territorial and non­territorial aboriginal title". 131 "Territorial aboriginal title" was 
likened to a right of ownership, or exclusive use and occupation ­ something akin to the 
127 New Zealand Herald, 25 March 1881. 
128 JLC, 1886, xii; 102. 
129 [1886] AJHR I­2, 28. 
130 Muriwhenua Fishing Report 207­208. 
131 P G  McHugh "The Legal Status of Maori Fishing Rights in Tidal Waters"  (1984) 14 VUWLR 247, 
258.
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notion of freehold.   "Non­territorial aboriginal title" comprised "rights of a lesser 
character which do not amount to a claim to exclusive 'ownership' but subsist by way of 
a charge upon the land." 132 
Building on this distinction, McHugh argued in later publications that the extinction 
of native title in New Zealand, by purchase or under the Native Land Acts, might have 
only affected the "territorial" component of that title, leaving "non­territorial" rights extant 
and cognisable at common law. 133 A modern court could examine some historical 
purchase to see if "non­territorial" elements of the native title had not been expressly 
extinguished. 134 Titles created under the Native Land legislation, especially after 1909, 
only affected the "territorial title" and will also leave "non­territorial" rights that may be 
recognised by a court.  It is said that the people entitled to the benefit of such rights are 
likely to be a wider class than the owners of the "territorial" title. 135 Any "non­territorial" 
rights that survive through the partial extinguishment of native title may exist as a 
burden over various categories of land, particularly Crown land. 136 
The notion that native title was so divisible has proved influential.  Williamson J, 
drawing on the McHugh articles, held in Te Weehi that the protection of "any Maori 
fishing right" in section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act included the non­exclusive, non­ 
territorial right that the appellant claimed to be exercising. 137 Earlier cases were 
distinguished on the grounds that they concerned claims to territorial title or exclusive 
rights.  It is not clear that Te Weehi concerned what is, strictly speaking, the foreshore. 
The language of the judgment and the fact that Mr Te Weehi was charged with taking 
paua suggests that it did not.  But the decision may imply a finding that the extinction of 
any native title to the ground on which the fishing occurred did not capture the "non­ 
territorial" right to fish.  The decision is not explicit on this point. 
An acceptance of partial extinguishment is, however, more apparent in the later case 
of Taranaki Fish & Game Council v McRitchie. 138 This case involved the taking of trout 
without a licence in an area where native title had evidently been extinguished.  The 
132 Above n 131, 256. 
133 P G  McHugh "Aboriginal Servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952" (1986) 16 VUWLR 313, 324 
134 Above n 133, 326. 
135 Above n 133, 325. 
136 P G  McHugh "The Legal Basis for Maori Claims against the Crown"  (1988) 18 VUWLR 1, 12 
137 Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 680, 692. 
138 [1997] DCR 446.  The decision has since been overturned by the High Court and the case has been 
taken on appeal to the Court of Appeal.
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alleged customary right to do so was held to be a Treaty or aboriginal right ­ the 
distinction was not seen as important ­ which was preserved by section 26ZH of the 
Conservation Act 1987.  This result strongly implies that the right confirmed by the Court 
survived the extinction of native title to the land on which it was exercised. 
Can Kauwaeranga be seen as a precedent for this development of the common law?  At 
most, the decision establishes that a right of fishery may, in special circumstances, co­ 
exist with Crown ownership of the underlying land.  Fenton's Kaitorete judgment stands 
for the same proposition, although the Court's jurisdiction in that case was limited to a 
question referred by the Governor under a statutory provision. 
But the crucial aspect of Kauwaeranga is how the blending of Maori rights with Crown 
ownership was accomplished.  This was manifestly not the outcome of a partial 
extinguishment of the full "territorial" title, because the applicants were never awarded so 
great an interest.   In the eyes of the Court, the right to receive a fee simple title did not 
extend to the foreshore and a fishing right was awarded instead.  No question of partial 
extinguishment could arise because there was no "territorial title" to become separated 
from the fishing right.  Thus, Kauwaeranga is not authority for the idea that native title 
was generally divisible into "territorial" and "non­territorial" components, which must 
both be expressly extinguished in order to free a piece of land from aboriginal rights. 
The "non­territorial" character of the rights awarded in Kauwaeranga should not be 
exaggerated.  Those rights were "territorial" in the sense that possession of the adjoining 
land appears to have been a pre­requisite.  This feature may have been overlooked by 
Cooke P in his observations on the case in the Muriwhenua fisheries case. 139 Rights to the 
Kauwaeranga mudflat were certainly apportioned according to ownership of the land 
and there is no clear evidence of the Court awarding similar rights where Maori did not 
possess the adjoining land.  The indications are that native title would not be found in 
such cases. 
The Kauwaeranga rights were, moreover, exclusive.  They do not bear analogy to the 
kind of "non­exclusive right" found in Te Weehi or McRitchie.  A "non­exclusive right" of 
this nature would not have been recognised by the Native Land Court in the nineteenth 
century, and there are suggestions in the evidence that such activity would not signify a 
"right" under the customary regime.  If non­exclusive rights had also to be expressly 
identified and extinguished to clear a parcel of land from Maori claims, the consequences 
139 Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney­General [1990] 2 NZLR 641, 655.   "The survival of fishing 
rights though land titles have been extinguished was recognised even as to the foreshore by Chief 
Judge Fenton in his Kauwaeranga Judgment of 1870..."  Lord Cooke is, of course, correct in the 
sense that the issuing of titles to the adjoining land extinguished customary ownership, but he 
seemed to have in mind the transfer of ownership.
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at the Thames would have been rather strange.  Having paid large sums to extinguish the 
exclusive rights of fishing identified by the Native Land Court, the Crown would have 
the further task of buying out the non­exclusive rights which, supposedly, still burdened 
the mudflats and formed, in effect, a bar to mining.  On McHugh's analysis, the holders 
of the latter rights might well be different people from those who had been paid for their 
exclusive rights. 140 This hypothesis is hard to reconcile with section 48 of the Native 
Lands Act 1865.  That section provides that a Crown grant based upon a purchase from 
the certified Maori owners "shall bar all estates rights titles and interests of all persons 
whomsoever therein except the grantees named therein..."  This wording does not 
suggest that the statute "recognised" that a lesser form of native title survived such a 
grant and could be vested in persons other than the certified former owners. 141 It is just 
as unlikely that such interests survived the issue of a certificate or grant to those former 
owners. 
McHugh argues that the complete extinguishment of both territorial and non­ 
territorial title could only be accomplished by a purchase that specified all "incidents" of 
the original native title, or by a Land Court order that included a "comprehensive 
enumeration of the traditional incidents". 142 There is a curious artificiality about this 
requirement.  It would perhaps be reasonable if the divisibility of native title was 
something that was indeed recognised at the time and for which provision could be 
made. 
But the colonisation of New Zealand proceeded upon different assumptions.  With 
the early abandonment of any prerogative claim to waste lands, there could be no 
question that native title ran over the vast areas that remained unpurchased. The colony 
could only expand through the progressive extinction of that title by, among other 
means, Crown purchases and the conversion of customary ownership under the Native 
Lands Acts.  These processes envisaged a native title that was not composite.  For the 
most part, it was supposed that native title either existed in full or was extinguished.  If it 
was found in some attenuated form, this was because a native right had been expressly 
reserved from sale (as Kaitorete demonstrates) or because native title was deemed not to 
have existed in its fullest form. 143 Kauwaeranga encapsulates the latter possibility and 
nothing more. 
140 P G  McHugh "Aboriginal Servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952" (1986) 16  VUWLR 313, 325. 
141 P G  McHugh "The Legal Status of Maori Fishing Rights in Tidal Waters" (1984) 14  VUWLR 247, 
258. 
142 Above n 140, 324. 
143 The definition of "easements" by Fenton in the aftermath of Kaitorete was followed by the 
enactment of the Ngaitahu Reference Validation Act 1868.  Section 2 provided that the orders of
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The Native Land legislation warrants further examination from this perspective.  As 
the terms of the first Acts make plain, the legislative intention was to transform native 
title into a new and more precise form of ownership.  The preambles speak of 
encouraging "the extinction of [Maori] proprietary customs and [providing] for the 
conversion of such modes of ownership into titles derived from the Crown" (the 1865 
Act) or the assimilation of these customs "as nearly as possible to the ownership of land 
according to British law" (the 1862 Act).  There is nothing to suggest that the new titles 
were in substitution for anything less than the full expression of native title.  It would 
hardly be consistent with "ownership... according to British law" if these Crown titles 
were to be encumbered by a host of vestigial "non­territorial" rights. 
In practice, Maori claimants usually recited a range of activities performed on the 
land as proof of their entitlement to a freehold title.  It seems incongruous to propose 
that, once the freehold title had been created, the right to conduct these activities survived 
as a burden on the new title, regardless of any later changes in ownership.  It is surely 
contrived to suggest that deeds of purchase or Land Court orders might have overcome 
this by comprehensively listing all non­territorial incidents of title.  The need to do this 
would not have been apparent at the time because neither the Legislature, the Native 
Land Court nor the practice of the Crown's representatives recognised the divisibility of 
native title, and hence the possibility of partial extinguishment.  The idea that the Land 
Court occasionally acknowledged non­territorial incidents by appending fishing rights to 
titles is not supported by evidence.  The only example cited appears to be the Whatapaka 
case. 144 This has been interpreted as award of a fishing right when in fact the Court 
issued a conventional title to land above mean high water mark.  The fact that this land 
was a shell bank does not mean that the award was a fishing right. 145 A requirement of 
cataloguing all non­territorial incidents would have introduced great uncertainties into 
the law.  How could one be sure that all possibilities had been covered?  As Fenton 
almost foreshadowed in his judgment, it seems that the categories of non­territorial title 
are only limited by the resourcefulness of prospective litigants. The idea now being 
the Native Land Court "shall be and be deemed to be in final extinguishment of the Native title" 
within the boundaries of the Ngaitahu (Kemp) purchase.  The legislature clearly intended a bar to 
any future claims based on the "mahinga kai" exception in the deed.  Given this two­step process 
of defining the exceptions and statutorily confirming the extinction of native title, it appears 
artificial to argue that other "non­territorial" rights, unspecified at that time, are still extant.  See P 
G  McHugh "The Legal Basis for Maori Claims against the Crown" (1988) 18 VUWLR 1, 12. 
144 P G  McHugh "Aboriginal Servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952" (1986) 16 VUWLR 313, 324. 
145 If it were the practice of the Court to record such rights, the irony would now be that rights 
deemed important enough to list are likely to have been conveyed or extinguished, while those not 
thought worthy of mention might now support a claim based on "non­territorial title".
172 (1999) 29 VUWLR 
mooted that the principle in McRitchie extends to ownership rights in the water itself 
serves as an illustration. 146 
The argument for non­territorial titles in New Zealand also rests on other grounds. 
Much is made of the treatment of aboriginal rights under North American law.  In order 
for this material to be relevant, however, it would be necessary to show that the creation 
of non­territorial titles in these jurisdictions bears analogy with the processes of 
identifying and extinguishing native title in New Zealand.  This is a complex matter, and 
it is hoped to examine it more closely on another occasion.  In the meantime, it suffices to 
note that the Kauwaeranga decision does not establish that such titles exist in New 
Zealand, at least as a result of partial extinguishment. 
146 The idea is not, however, entirely new.  While at Matamata in 1835, A N Brown recorded in his 
journal: "... soon after this another chief called on me to demand a payment for the water which 
our Girls are in the habit of fetching from a running stream in the neighbourhood, and in which he 
possesses only the common right of every Native of the place.  I asked him in a good humoured 
way how much he wanted for the running water and for the rain and sunshine, as it would be best 
to make one payment for all three things.  The Natives joined in a hearty laugh at the Chief in 
which he was obliged to join himself, and quietly gave up his claim."  A N  Brown Journal, 7 
September 1835, MS 319, Alexander Turnbull Library.
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X CONCLUSION 
In the current debate over Maori rights, context has been an early casualty in the 
desire to press Kauwaeranga into service.  The aim here has been to examine in more detail 
the circumstances of the decision. This limited exercise reveals several areas where a 
better appreciation of context may assist understanding.  The short conclusion is that, 
without such examination, ancient precedents such as Kauwaeranga will contribute little 
to the resolution of modern legal questions.
